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Summary findings
The Islamic Republic of Iran has committed itself to  energy prices  equal to about  10 percent of world market
substantial trade and market reform in its Third Five-  prices. Separately,  trade reform would lead to gains of
Year Development Plan.  It started out with nontariff  about 5 percent of income, exchange  rate reform to gains
barriers  on all products,  a dual exchange  rate regime  of 7 percent of income, and energy  pricing reform to
with the market rate  more than four times the  official  gains of 33 percent of income.
rate, and domestic  energy subsidies equal to about 90  The authors'  results show that well-intentioned
percent of the cost of energy products.  Many of these  commodity subsidy policies  for the poor can have
policies were justified as helping the poor.  perverse  effects.  Direct income payments to all
To analyze  the effect of the reforms, separately and  households  (not just the poor) would vastly increase the
together,  Jensen and Tarr develop  a multisector  incomes of the poor compared with the status quo.
computable general equilibrium model  with 10 rural and  Moreover,  if the combined reforms were implemented,
10 urban households.  They find that the combined  the poorest rural household would receive gains equal to
reforms could generate welfare  gains equal to about 50  about 290 percent  of its income, and the poorest urban
percent of aggregate consumer income. These gains  household gains equal to about 140 percent of its
reflect the large initial distortions-for  example, energy  income.
subsidies equal to about 18 percent of GDP,  and retail
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Reform Agenda,  Economic  Implications, and Impact on the Poor
I. Introduction
Iran has applied for membership  in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and with the
passage of the law for the Third Five Year Development Plan on April 5, 2000, the government
of Iran has committed itself to the use of the market mechanism  as a means of regulating foreign
trade. Iran began this reform process, however,  from a highly distorted trade and exchange rate
regime. The principal distortions  are: non-tariff barriers; the dual  exchange rate system and
highly subsidized petroleum product prices.  1 While applied tariffs were low, non-tariff barriers
(in the form of import licenses) restrained imports of all goods. A dual exchange rate system
prevailed in which the market rate was more than four times the official rate. Finally, petroleum
product prices in Iran were only about ten percent of world market prices.  Reforms are proposed
or contemplated  in all these areas, but the impact on the poor is a major issue in assessing
whether the reforms can be implemented.
While tariffication of non-tariff barriers and lowering of tariffs are important steps in the
Iranian effort to join the WTO, it is more important to assess the consequences of these actions
on Iranian development  and on the poor.  In this paper, we present quantitative  estimates of the
impacts of reform of all of the principal distortions mentioned above. We develop a multi-sector
computable general equilibrium model of the Iranian economy to provide the estimates.  The
model contains 20 households,  10 rural and  10 urban grouped according to income, so that in
addition to results at the sector and macro level, the model produces estimates of the impact on
the poor and on the distribution of income. The results for the poor households are crucial, given
the importance Iranian policy-makers  place on the impact of policy change on the poor.
More specifically,  the policy changes we consider and the motivation  for examining these
are as follows:
Tariffication of non-tariff barriers
In Article  115 of the law for the Third Five Year Development Plan, the government
indicates it plans to eliminate non-tariff barriers to foreign trade and substitute tariff barriers at
their equivalent level.2 Estimates of the tariff equivalence on non-tariff barriers are notoriously
difficult to obtain. We, however, have been fortunate to obtain these estimates for virtually all
major products in the economy. As a result, our estimates of the value to the economy of
' For more details on the institutional  background to the trade,  exchange rate and energy  sectors see World Bank
(1999 and 2001).
2 There  is an intergovernmental  committee  led by the Ministry of Commerce  that is responsible for tariffication of
non-tariff barriers. It decides on the timing of products to be converted  to tariff barriers and recommends  the
equivalent tariff level. Of the 5313 tariff lines in the Iranian code,  almost 1900 tariff lines have had the non-tariff
barriers removed by end 2000.tariffication of non-tariff barriers is, to our knowledge, the first data based estimate  for an
economy that is replete with such barriers.  Assuming rent dissipation of the non-tariff barriers
(we also provide estimates without rent dissipation) , tariffication will lead to an increase  in
Iranian aggregate welfare of 3.4 percent of the value of consumption  in the benchmark
equilibrium. 3 We assume that the additional revenue received by the government is distributed
back to households  in equal absolute amounts.  As a result, the poor gain substantially from this
policy reform (the poorest rural household gains 23 percent of its income and the poorest urban
household gains  11  percent).  The reason is that the poor have such little income that the
distributions from the government have a significant effect on their income.
Lowering Tariffs and Tariff Uniformity.
We next consider the impact of lowering tariffs to either a maximum 25 percent or to a
uniform  15 percent. 4 Both policies result in a significant increase  in welfare, but the poor gain
much more from uniform tariffs since uniformity  generates greater revenue for the government
relative to simply reducing all tariffs above 25 percent to 25 percent.
Unification of the Exchange Rate for Import Purchases (with and without consumption
subsidies).
Several Iranian government officials have indicated that it is the intention of the
government to unify the exchange rate for imports during the period of the 3rd Five Year
Development Plan. Certain imports qualify for foreign exchange at the official rate of 1750 Rials
per US dollar, whereas the Tehran Stock Exchange  (TSE) rate was about 8150 Rials per US
dollar in November 2000. In effect, imports of these commodities are subsidized by the
government through allocation of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate. These subsidies
were equal to almost 7 percent of GDP in 2000.
We estimate that the elimination of the subsidies to foreign exchange  will increase
aggregate welfare  by 6.9 percent of consumption. Despite the fact that some of the subsidies for
purchases of imports are intended to assist the poor, it is the poor who will disproportionately
gain from this policy.
Since the imported agricultural  commodities are part of the government's program to
help the poor, we also consider the policy of using consumption subsidies for essential
commodities to replace foreign exchange subsidies to essential commodities.  That is, when
subsidized imports are eliminated (for all products not just essential commodities), the
government at the same time is assumed to subsidize the consumption of essential commodities.
This policy is efficiency  enhancing compared with exchange rate subsidies, because exchange
3Welfare  estimates are Hicksian equivalent variation reported as  a percent of Iranian consumption (for aggregate
welfare)  or as a percent of household  consumption in the case of  individual households. Iranian  consumption is
about 37% of Iranian GDP in our dataset. Thus, the welfare gains as a percent of GDP, are about 37 hundreths of the
numbers reported  for welfare as a percent of consumption.
4This will also be an important step in the process of entering  the WTO,  since as a practical matter acceding
countries  in recent years have been required  to have low to moderate tariff barriers  in order to gain admission to the
WTO.
2rate subsidies discriminate against domestic production.  Consumption subsidizes  substantially
raise the price to Iranian producers of essential commodities  compared with the status quo of
subsidizing imports only, without, by assumption, raising the price to consumers.  The policy
produces welfare gains of 6.7 percent of consumption.  Since subsidizing particular products
retains a distortion, the aggregate  gains are lower than the policy of simply unifying the
exchange rate without consumption  subsidies.  More interestingly,  the welfare gains to the poor
are much lower (72 percent versus 46 percent of the value of consumption  is the gain).
Our results show that well-intentioned policies for the poor can have perverse effects, at
least when compared to direct income payments.  Even though the direct income payments we
consider (equal absolute payments to all households) are not targeted at the poor in our scenarios,
they do a better job of improving the welfare  of the poor than commodity subsidies, even though
the commodity subsidies are perceived to be aimed at the poor. The commodity subsidies create
inefficiencies between sectors. More importantly, the commodity subsidies  are not well targeted
for the poor since the rich buy more of all commodities,  including the subsidized  commodities.
In summary, we find that direct income payments, even if not well targeted  initially, are much
superior to commodity subsidies  in assisting the poor. More targeted direct income payments
would be even more efficient for the poor.
Energy Pricing Reform
Petroleum prices in Iran are only about  10 percent of world prices and we estimate that
the petroleum product subsidies are  18 percent of GDP.  If the fiscal surplus from the elimination
of the petroleum product subsidies is transferred back to the households in equal amounts, the
poorest rural (urban) household gains over 200 (100) percent of their income.
Combining Trade, Energy and Exchange  Rate Reform
Finally,  we estimate the impact of implementing  all the trade,  exchange rate and energy
policy reforms in the pricing area that we have  considered: tariffication,  tariff reduction,
exchange rate unification and energy pricing reform. The Iranian economy  is estimated to
experience and enormous gain of more than 50 percent of the value of consumption following
the combined reforms. With zero tariffs the gains are 50.7 percent of consumption; with a
uniform  15 percent tariff the aggregate welfare  gains are slightly less at 50.1 percent of
consumption.  The poor gain slightly more from the uniform tariff at  15 percent since we assume
the fiscal surplus is distributed to the poor and there is a greater fiscal surplus to distribute with
the  15  uniform tariff.
The estimated gains in welfare that we find are extremely large by the standards of this
type of model (constant returns to scale model).  Constant returns to scale numerical modeling
estimates of the impact of trade liberalization have often found that trade liberalization  increases
the welfare of a country by only about one-half to one percent of GDP.s  The very large
5)Examples of constant returns to scale  models with estimates of welfare  gains from trade liberalization of less than
one percent  of GDP include:  de  Melo  and  Tarr (1990;  1992;  1993);  Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr (1993;  1997a;
1997b);  Morkre  and  Tarr  (1980;  1995);  and Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984).  Imperfect  competition  and product  variety,
however,  can result in much larger estimated gains (Rutherford and Tarr, forthcoming).
3estimated welfare  gains reflect the unusually high level of distortions present at the starting point
of the reform in Iran. The combined fiscal impact of all the reforms (with a  15 percent uniform
tariff) is estimated to be an increase in the fiscal surplus by 18.5 percent of GDP.
The fiscal surplus generated by the reforms presents great opportunities for Iran to help
the poor with direct income support payments. These payments are potentially vastly more
efficient in terns of help to the poor than commodity subsidies,  and there should be sufficient
revenue generated,  that the real incomes of the poor (after adjusting for higher prices of
commodities) could be significantly improved. The fiscal surplus will also permit investment
where appropriate  such as institutional development  to assist private sector development.
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we describe the key data on the tariffs,
non-tariff barriers and subsidies that are fundamental to the results of the model. In section 3, we
briefly describe the model and other aspects of the data. In section 4 we present and interpret the
results of the policy scenarios. This includes individual policy reforms an combinations of policy
reforms. We provide conclusions  in section 5 and an elaboration of the construction of the
database in the appendix.
II. Data on the tariffs, non-tariff barriers and subsidies
In the section we explain how we obtained data on the key distortions to the trade and
exchange  rate regime.  It is well known that these data are fundamental to the results of the
analysis.  We explain the data on the energy subsidies in the appendix.
Data regarding tariff rates in the initial year
Imports into Iran are subject to both an import duty and the commercial benefit tax
(CBT).6 What would normally be referred to as the tariff on imports is the sum of these two
items. Actual collected tariffs, however, in Iran are quite low by international  standards.  Based
on customs department data for collected tariffs in fiscal year 1998/99, aggregate collected tariffs
were 0.3 percent of GDP.  Collected tariff rates are rather low for two reasons:  (1)  for the
purposes of customs valuation, all imports are valued at the official exchange rate. This amounts
to 78 percent reduction in assessed import duties relative to the market exchange rate as of
November 2000; and (2) the principal means of import protection has been non-tariff barriers
exercised through licensing requirements. 7
For the sectors in our model, we present the average collected  duty and CBT in table 1.
These data were calculated as follows.  Since up to date applied tariff data are important,  we
obtained the collected tariff data at the tariff line level for fiscal year 1999/2000.  Iran employs
the International Harmonized  System at the 6-digit level, which contains 5313 tariff lines.8
6There are also some small fees the most notable of which is  the registration  fee at the Ministry of Commerce.
These fees, however, are collectively still quite small relative to the import duty and the CBT.
7In addition there are some exemptions from the payment of import taxes such as duty drawback.
a Iran intends to disaggregate some of the tariff lines, introducing tariff lines at the eight or possibly ten digit level to
reflect national needs.
4These tariff lines were aggregated with simple averages to obtain the average  collected tariff at
the level the sectors in our model.  Since it is what the importer pays that affects  the decision to
purchase, collected tariff rates should be superior to legal tariff rates. Thus, we updated the data
in the input-output table for our model with collected tariff rates for 1999/2000.
Tariff equivalence  of the non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
Tariffication Plans and Progress. With the passage of the Third Five Year
Development Plan, Iran has committed itself to tariffication of the NTBs.  In previous years,  an
import license was required for goods that could be legally imported. That is, there was a
"Positive List" of goods that were not banned.  If the good were on the Positive List it could be
legally imported, but it still required a license from the responsible industry, typically the
Ministry of Industry,  Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Mines.
The commitment to tariffy the NTBs has manifested itself in several ways.  First, the
Positive List is rapidly expanding.  In fiscal year 1998/99 the Positive List consisted of 29 broad
categories of products.  This was expanded to 41 broad product categories  in early 2000 and 77
broad product categories  by November 2000. It is expected that the Positive List will include all
products except for those banned for religious  or health and safety reasons.
Second, the requirement to obtain a license by the relevant line Ministry is being
eliminated.  Only the registration requirement at the Ministry of Commerce (which is
accomplished  routinely within a few days) will remain for virtually all goods when the
tariffication  process is complete.9 As of November 2000,  line Ministry licensing had been
eliminated for 1900 tariff lines out of the 5313 tariff lines in the Iranian system. In addition, the
decision had been taken by the government to eliminate line Ministry licensing for an additional
895 tariff lines categories. Finally,  during the transition,  if the item is on the Positive List it is
reported that even for those products which still require line Ministry licensing, the line
Ministries are providing the license more rapidly than in the past.
Estimated tariff equivalence  of the NTBs.  The intergovernmental  committee  chaired by
the Ministry of Commerce,  which includes the Ministry of Industry, is responsible for
recommending  the tariff equivalent of the NTBs. International  versus domestic price
comparisons  are being done based on a database of prices. The database contains 70 million
observations  from Iranian customs declarations.  The Ministry of Industry has been responsible
for providing the licenses for approximately  3000 of the tariff lines in the manufacturing  sectors
and it has estimated the tariff equivalence of the NTBs for the 3000 tariff lines for which it is
responsible.  We have obtained estimates from the Ministry of Industry of Iran of the new
commercial  benefit tax necessary to provide tariff equivalence of the NTBs and have
supplemented that information with the following consideration.  For imports that are subsidized
in the initial period, we take the tariff equivalence to be zero.' 0 For imports that are not on the
9 Provided licenses are routinely issued within ten working days of application for the import license, licensing is not
considered a non-tariff barrier under WTO rules.
' Several  sectors in our model  are combinations  of sub-sectors.  Sometimes,  one sub-sector may receive  import
subsidies, while another sub-sector receives no import subsidies, but is protected by licenses.  In these cases,  we
report the tariff equivalence  of the non-tariff barrier as the tariff equivalent rate which applies on the protected  sub-
sector times  its share  of the overall sector.
5Positive List, the tariff equivalence of the NTB should be very high,  since it can't legally be
imported.  For products on the Positive List, we assume the tariff equivalence is lower than for
those products that are not on the Positive List.
We are able to calculate the tariff equivalence of the NTBs from the data we have as
follows. Define:
PM  = the domestic price of imports in Rials
PW  - the border price of imports in dollars
ER  = the market exchange rate (Tehran Stock Exchange rate), Rials per dollar
TD  = the customs duty
CBT(O)  = the commercial  benefit tax prior to tariffication
CBT(1)  = the commercial benefit tax after tariffication
NTB  = the tariff equivalent of the non-tariff barrier in ad valorem terms.
Prior to tariffication, there is a NTB in place. Although we do not have data directly on
the tariff equivalent of the non-tariff barrier (NTB),  it is defined by the following equation:
PM = PW*ER[1+TD+CBT(O)][1+NTB].
After tariffication, the NTB is removed  and replaced by a higher CBT. We have:
PM = PW*ER[l+TD+CBT(l)].
As mentioned, we have obtained estimates of CBT(1) from the Ministry of Industry and
other considerations.  Since the increase in the CBT is supposed to leave the domestic price of
imports unchanged,  we have:
PM = PW*ER[1+TD+CBT(O)][1+NTB]  = PW*ER[1+TD+CBT(l)]
or
[1 +TD+CBT(O)] [1 +NTB] = [1 +TD+CBT( l)].
Rearranging, the tariff equivalent of the NTB is:
NTB = [l+TD+CBT(l)]/[l+TD+CBT(O)]  - 1
We have data on all of the right hand side variables.  Thus, we may calculate the left hand
side which is the tariff equivalent of the non-tariff barrier. These estimates are presented in table
1  .The NTB rate for a sector typically represents the average tariff equivalent in a product
category,  since each category represents  many tariff lines. These estimates are based on the
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) exchange rate, i.e., they are about 20% of the tariff equivalents
that would prevail if imports were valued at the official exchange rate. It is the intention of Iran
to convert to customs valuation at the TSE rate, but more importantly, we need rates that reflect
real costs that induce resource movement,  so we must use the TSE rate for the tariff equivalents
of the NTBs.
6Distribution of the Rents from the NTBs. A key question in assessing the consequences
of tariffication of the NTBs is what happens to the quota rents when the NTBs are in place.  We
model this is two ways: one is which all the rents are dissipated  through rent seeking,  and the
second where the rents are distributed lump sum to the owners of the firms who obtain the
licenses, with no rent dissipation.  We believe the appropriate result is between these two
extremes, with the true state closer to rent dissipation. We take rent dissipation  as our central
assumption unless otherwise indicated.
Rent dissipation follows from the conventional  theory of rent seeking. The model of
Barzel (1973), for example,  maintains that resources are expended to obtain the licenses, and that
competition among license seekers results in costs that dissipate the rents available.  The classic
example is queuing for a good under price control.  In this case the queue lengthens until the
value of the time in the queue  is just equal to the difference between the market price and the
controlled price of the good. In the case of licenses for imports there are lobbying costs, queuing
costs and inefficiencies  in the cost of the delivery of final products where the imported good is
an intermediate.  Given that the license to import has value, competition among license seekers
will dissipate the rents.  Since the value of the license to import is the difference between the
domestic price and the tariff inclusive world price, competition for rents would not dissipate the
tariff revenue. Thus, the difference between the domestic  and world price of quota constrained
products is part tariff and part rent, where the rent is competed away in higher costs for the rent
seekers. Elimination of the NTB through tariffication  would eliminate the rent from obtaining the
license to import and eliminate the wasteful  expenditure of resources  on rent seeking behavior.
Thus, this view of license allocation implies there are real resource  gains for conversion to the
tariff equivalents of NTBs and welfare should increase significantly for all households.  In
addition, the poor are likely to gain, since we shall assume that the tariff revenue of the
government will be distributed to all households in equal amounts.
No  rent dissipation would occur if recipients of the licenses to import are unable to
influence the decision on who gets the licenses.  That is, the size of the firm or any payments  or
lobbying of officials is irrelevant regarding the receipt of the license.  When a firm receives the
license to import, it receives a windfall profit equal to the difference  between the domestic price
of the imported product and the tariff inclusive  import price, i.e., it receives the tariff equivalent
of the quota. We assume this value accrues to the owners of the factors of production in the firm.
This value ultimately is part of household income, since the owners of the factors of production
are the households.  When we impose tariffs  and eliminate the NTBs counterfacturally,  under this
assumption of no rent dissipation, the tariff revenue of the government  increases, and the
government distributes the tariff revenue back to the households in an equal lump sum manner.
Although this will be little or no efficiency or aggregate welfare effect from this process,  the will
be significant distribution of income effects. In particular, the poor will be better off and the rich
worse off under our distribution mechanism.  This is, because the rents from the quotas accrued
to the owners of the factors of production in the economy (of which the poor hold a small share),
whereas the tariff revenue is distributed to the households in equal  shares.
7Data regarding centrally allocated  foreign  exchange
In fiscal year  1999/2000 the official rate for a US  dollar was 1750 Rials and the market
rate was approximately  8150 Rials per US dollar. In general, exporters receive the market
exchange rate for their exports and importers who do not receive  centrally allocated foreign
exchange pay the market exchange rate.  Consequently, the principal impact of the dual exchange
rate is to provide a subsidy to those who receive centrally allocated foreign exchange for imports.
Since centrally allocated dollars at the official exchange rate cost only about 21 percent of
dollars from the market, those who received centrally allocated dollars received a subsidy of
about 79 percent of the market value of the dollars. At the same time producers in these sectors
are disprotected (or are facing an effective negative tariff) by 79 percent.
We wish to determine the impacts of unifying the exchange rate for current account
purposes. Unification will have resource allocation and efficiency effects because it removes the
subsidy to foreign exchange for imports of certain products and for imports for specified
purposes.
Imported goods qualifying for foreign exchange at the official exchange rate fall into one
of the following categories:  essential food commodities, pharmaceuticals  and petroleum
products, investment demand for state owned enterprises and national defense."  1
Essential food commodities comprise wheat, rice, sugar, cooking oil and milk powder.
The Government  Trading Corporation imports these products.  They fall into three sectors in of
our model: farming, sugar and other food products.  Imports of these commodities collectively
represent 10 percent of the value of imports at the official exchange rate. The Ministry of Health
imports pharmaceuticals,  which is about one percent of the value of imports.  The Iranian
National Oil Company imports petroleum products, comprising an additional  8 percent of the
value of imports.
Our measure of the subsidy to the sector is adjusted proportionately based on the share of
the sector's imports that is subsidized. In the case of sugar and pharmaceuticals,  all imports
receive the subsidy, so the subsidy is listed at 79 percent.  Farming and other food products have
the subsidy reduced in proportion to the share of imports in the sector that receive the subsidy. 12
Regarding the investment projects of the State Owned Enterprises, one of the largest
categories  of imports in our IO table is "industrial machinery."  We assume that 75 percent of
these imports are destined for the investment demand of the State Owned Enterprises at the
official exchange rate. The subsidy rate is thus estimated at 59 percent (75 percent of 79 percent).
" Debt repayment (both central  government and individual enterprise)  also qualifies for foreign exchange  at the
official exchange rate.
12 We employed Customs Department mimeo data to calculate  the share of imports in the farming and food products
categories  that are comprised of subsidized commodities. For customs valuation purposes, all imports are valued at
the official exchange rate. The government intends to value all imports  at the rate of exchange from the Tehran
Stock Exchange.
8Based on data from the Central Bank of Iran, fifty percent of imported goods in fiscal
year  1999/2000 were imported at the official exchange  rate. The sum of the above categories
above represents 32 percent of the value of imports based on the data in the input-output  table.
In addition to the above imports, which are for the purpose of private consumption  or
intermediate use in industry, the central government allocates foreign exchange  for the national
defense.  We take national defense as the residual  18  percent of centrally allocated foreign
exchange at the official exchange rate. We assume that national defense  is the central
government's  own final consumption.  That is, the central government holds foreign exchange
that is uses to purchase imported goods for its own consumption in the form of national  defense
expenditures.  As a result the rate at which the foreign exchange is accounted for national defense
purposes is irrelevant  for economic decision-making,  and we ignore national defense
expenditures  in the analysis that follows.
Energy Subsidies
Direct energy subsidies apply on four of the seven energy products in our model:
gasoline, kerosene,  gas oil and fuel oil. Since the subsidies are on consumption of the products,
they apply on imports as well as domestic  consumption. (Iran imports small amounts of these
products.)  We obtained data from the Iranian Ministry of Oil on the domestic consumption price
of the four energy products and the world price at the comparable  period. Since we take world
prices as exogenous  to Iran, we calculate  the subsidy rates as between 74%  and 94%.
Table 0: Estimated domestic  and international prices for petroleum products, 1999/2000
Domestic prices  International Prices*  Ratio (%)  Subsidy
(Rials/.iter)  (Rials/liter)rate
Gasoline  350.0  1329.2  26.3%  73.7%
Kerosene  100.0  1254.3  8.0%  92.0%
Gas oil  100.0  1136.9  8.8%  91.2%
Fuel  oil  50.0  880.6  5.7%  94.3%
*Note:  Intermational  prices are converted to Rials at the market exchange rate on the Tehran Stock Exchange  of
8150 Rials per dollar.
Source:  Iranian Ministry of Oil and authors'  calculations
III. The Model
Our Small Open Economy (SOE) model is designed for trade policy analysis with a large
number of sectors. The model is a generic constant returns to scale  general equilibrium model of
a single small open economy.  Explanation of the equations  for this type of model may be found
in de Melo and Tarr [1992, chapter 3].  We describe here the general features of the model here,
but refer the reader to de Melo and Tarr for a mathematical treatment. Given its importance  in
the Iranian economy, energy plays a more central role in our model than in de Melo and Tarr.
We characterize the structure of production for the energy and non-energy sectors in figures  1-3.
9Consumer demand is depicted in figure 4. The principal departure from the model of de Melo
and Tarr is the treatment of multiple households.
Table I lists the 43 production sectors in the model. Goods are produced using primary
factors and intermediate inputs.  Primary factors include labor and capital. In addition,  land is a
factor of production that is specific to the production of agriculture.  Labor and capital  are
perfectly mobile which yields a unique real wage rate and rental rate on capital for the entire
economy. Goods used as intermediates are an "Armington" composite of domestic and imported
goods. The world prices of imported and exported  goods are fixed, i.e., the small open economy
assumption which implies the absence of any terms of trade effects. Production exhibits constant
returns to scale and individual firms behave competitively, selecting output levels such that
marginal cost at those output levels equals the given market price. From Euler's theorem,
payments to primary factors exhaust value added. Output in all sectors except for crude oil is
differentiated between goods destined for the domestic and export markets.  This relationship is
characterized by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) frontier. Composite output is an
aggregate of domestic output and exports. The structure of production  and allocation of output
for the non-energy sectors are depicted in figure I (with elasticities).
Regarding the  crude oil sector, we continue to employ the assumption of constant returns
to scale, Armington aggregates for intermediates,  cost minimization and marginal cost pricing.
The sector differs from other sectors in that production of oil requires the use of a sector-specific
primary factor, i.e., natural resources (oil). We assume that the government owns this primary
factor and consequently the government receives the returns from this primary factor. Capital
and labor are mobile factors among all sectors and receive the unique wage rate and return on
capital. Given that natural resources is a specific factor of production  owned by the government
and constant returns to scale prevail, the royalties or rents to the government vary residually such
that zero profits prevail.  This structure results in the government,  in effect, being the residual
claimant to the revenues from the sale of produced oil after the payment of intermediate goods,
wages, and rent on capital to produce oil. This appears  appropriate in view of the fact that the
revenues from the Iranian National Oil Company are reported as part of the government's
budget, unlike the treatment of other state owned enterprises.  We report any changes in oil rents
as part of changes in government revenue from policy changes.
We assume that crude oil output is a homogeneous product witn no distinction between
Iranian crude oil and the crude  oil on the world market.  The structure of production and
allocation of output for oil are depicted in figure 2. This structure follows Bernstein,
Montgomery,  Rutherford and Yang (1999).
Given its importance in the Iranian economy, we have seven sectors in the model that
produce refined energy products:  gasoline, kerosene, fuel oil, gas oil, liquid gas, natural gas, and
electricity.  The first four of these are the sectors where consumption is heavily subsidized
directly (the estimates were listed above).  Although the structure of production is somewhat
different for energy sectors compared with non-energy sectors (see figure 3), the assumptions of
constant returns to scale, Armington aggregates for intermediates,  cost minimization, marginal
cost pricing and zero profit equilibrium  continue to apply in these sectors. We also continue to
10apply the CET assumption for sectors where there are exports initially. 13 The principal
distinctions  for these sectors are the modeling of energy inputs and, crucially,  energy subsidies.
Regarding the modeling of energy inputs in refined energy production, we assume zero
substitution both between energy inputs and, most importantly,  between energy inputs and other
inputs. This reflects that there is a roughly fixed physical relationship between, for example, the
amounts of crude oil required to produce a given amount of gasoline.
Regarding the energy subsidies, we assume that consumers pay an artificially  low and
controlled price  for energy products (shown in the table above) and that the government pays the
difference,  i.e., a subsidy, such that demand is met at the controlled price.  Sellers of energy
receive the payment by consumers plus the subsidy, and domestic producers optimize their
output decisions between domestic  sales and exports according to  a CET.  Since the price paid
by domestic consumers  remains fixed, if the domestic market for energy does not clear, the
government will alter the subsidy rate.  Thus, the subsidy rate is endogenous to policy changes,
and we report in the results the amount by which petroleum product subsidies changes in each
scenario.  We illustrate this government intervention in figure 5, where  for simplicity, and
contrary to our model, we assume that exports and domestic products are homogeneous.
There are 20 household types in the model,  10  urban and  10 rural,  all grouped according
to income.  The 10 rural household types contain 3 8% of the Iranian population  with an equal
number of households  in each group (i.e., 3.8%).  Similarly, each urban household type contains
6.2% of Iranian households.  Our estimates are that the poorest two urban and poorest two rural
households are below the one dollar a day poverty line. The shares of each consumer's
expenditure  on different commodities  differ. Based on the household expenditure  survey we
present the budget shares of households in table 2, where we have aggregated commodities into
energy, food, transportationi and other commodities.  The "other" category increases with income.
Although we have the source of income by factor of production for households in aggregate,  we
do not have data for the factor income source at the level of the individual household.
Consequently,  we assume that all households obtain their income from the different factors of
production in identical proportions. 14 The structure of demand is depicted in figure 4.
Gover-nment demand for goods and services and investment demand are exogenous.
Government revenue derives from rents on crude oil, import tariff revenues and exogenous
lump-sum taxes. Government expenditures finance the exogenous government demand for goods
and services, plus subsidies to foreign exchange for imports, subsidies to petroleum products and
(in one counterfactual) food subsidies.
We impose an "equal yield constraint"  on government revenue,  i.e., any loss (gain) of
government revenue must be offset by a lump sum tax (subsidy). In all of our scenarios,  the
'3  There are no exports  of liquid gas, gasoline, kerosene,  gas oil,  electricity,  construction and postal services in the
initial equilibrium.  Thus,  the requirements  for the CET assumption are not satisfied,  and we assume that the output
of these four sectors can not be exported.
14 The trade  and exchange  rate reforms tend to favor the farming,  sugar and weaving and leather products  sectors.
These sectors should intensively use unskilled labor, the key source of income for the poorest households. This
might allow us to predict that the poor would be expected to do no worse than we have estimated from these
reforms.government is reducing subsidies, which reduce  government expenditures.  In all scenarios we
hold the government demand for goods unchanged (otherwise welfare analysis would be
meaningless, since only consumers obtain utility and only from private goods). Consequently,
when government revenues are increased, they are endogenously distributed back to households
so that the government demands are unchanged.  Thus, government demand is balanced with
revenue (which is consistent with the loose requirement in Iran to balance the budget). We,
however, calculate  and present the impact of all policy changes on the revenues of the
government, and policymakers in practice may consider alternate expenditures for these revenues
such as institution building to assist the development of the private sector.
The decision rule we typically adopt is that lump sum distributions of the government
are given to households in equal shares.  That is, suppose the government is distributing  10,000
Rials. Since rural households in aggregate  constitute  32% of all households, it will provide 320
Rials to each of the  10 rural household types. It will provide  680 Rials to each of the 10 urban
household types, which collectively represent 68% of all households.  This implies that all
individual households, rural and urban, receive the same Rial amount.
We suggest this decision rule for distributions for several reasons. First, although less
efficient as a safety net for the poor than lump sum distributions targeted at the poor, more
targeted distributions have the difficulty that it may be administratively  difficult to identify who
are the poor.  Some of the poor, who can ill afford a period of lowered income, may be excluded
inadvertently.  Second, on political economy grounds, if all households receive distributions,
there is likely to be less opposition to the reforms. Third, if all households receive distributions,
then there is no disincentive to work as a result of the distribution scheme, i.e., no income level
at which additional earnings result in ineligibility for distributions and a net reduction in after
distribution income.
Criticism of our distribution scheme has taken two forms. First, some argue that
distributions to the rich are politically unacceptable.  We note, however, that all Iranians are
recipients of government commodity subsidies and the wealthy receive larger subsidies than the
poor since subsidies are in proportion to consumption. For example, the per capita benefits of
fuel subsidies to members of the richest urban quintile were 6.7 times the per capita benefits to
those in the poorest urban quintile. For the rural quintiles the corresponding ratio was 5.5 (World
Bank,  1999).  Thus, compared to commodity  subsidies, our distribution rule will be a progressive
distribution scheme since the poorest households receive less than an equal share of most
commodity subsidies (even the subsidies targeted for the poor) because they consume less of
virtually all goods.
Second, some have suggested that the distribution scheme is not feasible-that it is not
possible to set up a system to monitor who has received a distribution and that the system will be
plagued by fraud. But we note that Iran has a photo identification system in place for the
distribution of ration coupons for edible oils, sugar and cheese that has been in place since the
time of the Iran-Iraq war. Bearers present their ID to a bank and receive the coupons. This
system could be expanded to cover cash distributions.  The likelihood of fraud would increase if
substantial amounts of cash were involved,  but fraud would require complicity of the bank teller.
12Additional  study to assess how fraud could be reduced is appropriate,  but fraud is prevalent in
any safety net distribution system.
Since private consumption equals the income from primary factors plus net transfers  by
the households to the government (from domestic and foreign trade taxes), Walras  law is
satisfied.
World market import and export prices are fixed, so there are no endogenous changes in
the terms of trade.  In other words, import supplies and export demands are infinitely elastic at
given world prices.  The real exchange rate in the model adjusts such that the current account
balances the value of exports and imports taking into account exogenously fixed capital inflows.
Our model allows for changes in these fixed world prices, such as a change  in the price of crude
oil on world markets.' 5
The appendix  contains more details on the model structure and the construction of the
underlying database.
IV. Policy  Results
Results of the main policy simulations are presented in table 3.  In the first column of
table 3, we present summary  data regarding the fiscal situation in the initial equilibrium of the
model.  Import taxes and foreign exchange subsidies have been discussed above. Petroleum
subsidies are due to the energy policy of providing petroleum products at a given domestic price.
These subsidies vary with the cost of foreign exchange since some of these products are
imported.  Oil rent is the revenue that accrues to the government from the sale of oil after
payments to labor and capital to produce the oil. Revenues or subsidies from each of these
sources can change in any scenario due to a direct change in the policy related to the tax or
subsidy or to an indirect effect when another variable is changed.  The latter can have "second
best" effects as we will discuss below.  The fiscal effects are reported as a percent change  from
the benchmark equilibrium  (where we consider that the rents from import licensing  are
dissipated).
Tariffication of Non-Tariff Barriers
As discussed in the data section above, the impact of the tariffication of NTBs depends
on whether the rents from the existing NTBs are dissipated through rent seeking.  We do two
simulations: one in which all the rents are lost to rent seeking behavior and the other in which no
rents are lost.  We believe the actual situation is closer to rent dissipation and employ rent
dissipation as our central assumption.
Dissipation of the Rents from the NTBs.  In column (1) of table 3 we present results of
the scenario we call Tariffification.  In this scenario rents from the NTBs are dissipated in the
benchmark equilibrium. Tariffication  then has the effect of increasing  aggregate welfare  by 3.4
15 The OPEC quota on oil exports  is typically not binding on Iran.
13percent of initial household income. Although all households gain from this scenario, the
positive impact on the welfare of the poor households is dramatic:  the poorest rural household
gains 23 percent and the poorest urban household  gains  11  percent. The reason for this favorable
distribution effect on the poor is that as a result of converting NTBs to tariffs, the collected tariffs
of the government increase by 2 percent (to 2.3 percent of GDP). On the other hand, government
revenues  are endogenously  affected by the depreciation of the real exchange rate. The output and
income expansion induces an increase  in the demand for imports. The real exchange rate must
depreciate to restore equilibrium in the balance of trade. The depreciated exchange rate implies
that the cost of the government subsides to foreign exchange and to imported petroleum products
increases, worsening the government's fiscal position. On the positive side, the revenues the
government receives (after factor payments) from the sale of oil on world markets increases with
exchange rate depreciation by 0.5 percent of GDP. On balance the fiscal impact of the
government is positive  1.4 percent. As discussed above, it is necessary  to adopt a decision rule
for what the government does with the additional revenue from the reforms (or how it obtains
revenue if there is a loss in revenue).  Unless otherwise specified,  we assume that these additional
revenues  are distributed back to households in equal absolute amounts per household (obviously,
alternate expenditures  are possible with the additional government revenues).  Since the poor
have such low incomes, the distribution of these revenues represents a significant share of their
income.
An interesting and unique aspect of this scenario is that the output of all Iranian
industries expands. This is because the rent seeking behavior consumed real resources, labor and
capital. Tariffication  freed these resources from wasteful activity to produce output. At the same
time, the increase  in the supply of labor and capital for production results in a fall in the real
wage of 0.1  percent and a fall in the rental rate on capital of 0.4 percent.  The impact on incomes
is more than offset by the additional output available from productive use of the newly available
capital and labor and the income transfers from the government.
Tariffication of NTBs without Rent Dissipation.  The results of this scenario are
presented in column 2 of table 3. The principle impact of the tariffication of NTBs without rent
dissipation is the increase in government revenues. Again the government revenues increase by
2.0 percent of GDP, and again the increase in government revenue is distributed back to
households  in equal Iranian Rial amounts.  As a result the poor households gain substantially,
even though the rich households lose in this scenario.  The distributional  impacts are strictly
progressive because we had assumed in this scenario that the rents from the quotas were not
dissipated. Rather they accrued to the households in proportion to their income.  Thus,
tariffication without rent dissipation  implies that the households lose the rents from the quotas in
proportion to their income.
The aggregate welfare impact of this scenario is slightly negative for two reasons. First,
tariffication without rent dissipation results in the same set of international prices and no
improved resource allocation regarding the international trade regime.  But, tariffication results in
a negative second best effect due to the increased  consumption of food and energy products.
Given the change in the distribution of income, expenditure  in the economy  shifts toward the
budget items consumed more intensely by the poorer households.  As shown in table 2, the poor
intensively consume food, energy and transportation (and transportation  is an intense direct user
14of energy subsidies).  The increased demand for food and energy results in a slight reduction  in
economy-wide  efficiency and welfare because these products are excessively consumed in the
initial equilibrium due to the subsidies.
On the other hand, the poorest household actually gains more in this scenario.  The reason
is that while the rents from the licenses are distributed to households  in proportion to their
income,  the poor receive a disproportionately  large share of the transfers relative to their
incomes. The government budget expands by a larger amount without rent dissipation because
the lower output expansion induces a much smaller the real exchange rate depreciation.  This in
turn implies a smaller increase in the cost of petroleum product subsidies (even though the
quantity of petroleum products consumed domestically  increases).
The impact of the different policy changes on domestic output, prices and exports at the
sector level is presented  in tables 5.4 and 5.6.
Unification  of the Exchange  Rate
We evaluate the impact of unifying the exchange rate for the purpose of imports and
exports.  More specifically,  we simulate the removal  of subsidies through centrally allocated
foreign exchange  at the official exchange  rate for essential commodities (wheat, rice, sugar,
cooking oil, milk powder and pharmaceuticals),  and for the investment demands of state owned
enterprises.  Petroleum product consumption subsidies are considered part of energy policy so we
retain them except in the energy policy scenarios.
The objective of the subsidized foreign exchange for essential commodities is to assist
the poor. Consequently,  we consider alternate  safety net programs to assist the poor if these
subsidies  are removed. We consider two alternate programs that might be designed to address the
needs of the poor when the subsidies to essential commodities  and other foreign exchange
subsidies  are removed: equal lump sum distributions;  and consumption subsidies to keep the
price of essential commodities unchanged to consumers. We illustrate the welfare economics  and
impact on government revenues of the two mechanisms  in figure 6.
Equal Lump Sum Distributions to All Households.  First, when we eliminate the
foreign exchange  subsidies, we consider the impact of distributing the additional revenue  the
government  obtains from the elimination of the subsidies back to all households in an equal lump
sum payment to each household.  This is our basic distribution mechanism.  The results are
presented in table 3, column 5. The reason all households are included is that it may be difficult
to identify at first which households  are the poor. Over time, it may become possible to
accurately  identify the rich and poor households,  at which time the safety net payments can be
targeted more precisely. 1 6 But so that no needy household is excluded,  some would argue that
such a broad payment approach is initially required.
16 This was the process employed in Jordan  in the  1  990s, where food subsidies were converted initially to a payment
to all households,  but became  targeted to only the poor over several years.  Iran has in place an identification  card
system which could be used as a basis  for providing the subsidies.
15The aggregate welfare gain from this policy is a very large 6.9 percent increase as a
percent of income, and corresponds in figure 6 to the gains from elimination of both the
production and consumption deadweight loss. This shows how very inefficient a dual exchange
rate regime can be when the exchange rate subsidies are as large as four or five to one.
The prices of the essential commodities increase significantly,  11  percent for farm
products,  6 percent for food and 38 percent for sugar. Despite these price increases, what is
really striking is the enormous increase in the welfare of the poorest households. The poorest two
rural households (both earn less than one dollar per day) experience an increase in their welfare
of 72 and 45 percent. The poorest urban households gain 32 and 20 percent.  These households
are so poor that the lump sum distribution payments represent a substantial portion of their
income. Note that all individual households gain from this policy but that this distribution
scheme is monotonically progressive: the poorer the household,  the larger the percentage gain.
Thus, even though the distribution scheme is not perfectly targeted at the poor,  it is a highly pro-
poor distribution scheme.
There is a significant positive output response of the farming sector of 13 percent as a
result of an increase in the price of domestic farm products by 7 percent. The import subsidies
represent an implicit tax on the farming sector which have to compete with heavily subsidized
imports. Removing  subsidies to imports, results in an increase in the price of farm products and
removes the implicit tax on Iranian farmers.  Their output expands as a result. Similarly, the other
domestic producing  sectors that competed with subsidized imports (sugar, food product
producers of oils, pharmaceuticals  and industrial machinery)  see demand for their products
increase  and they respond with increased production in the new equilibrium. These sectors
expand considerably and compete resources away from the other sectors. The elimination of
subsidies to imports reduces the demand for foreign exchange so there is a strong appreciation of
the real exchange rate by an estimated  13 percent.  Output effects by sector are also partly
explained by the appreciation.
Subsidies to the Consumption of Essential Commodities,  Equal Lump Sum Taxes.
With the elimination of subsidized foreign exchange for imports, an alternate  scheme for the
protection of the poor that is sometimes proposed is subsidized consumption of the essential
commodities.  That is, in this scenario, instead of subsidizing imports, there is a subsidy to
consumption of the essential commodities:  pharmaceuticals,  sugar, farm products and other food
products. The results are presented in tables 3 and 3A, column  6. This subsidy does not
discriminate according to the geographic source of the imports. This removes the implicit tax on
domestic producers of the import competing product from subsidies to imports. Figure 6
illustrates the situation, where the consumption deadweight loss is retained, but the gains are due
to the elimination of the production  deadweight loss.
We observe a very substantial aggregate welfare gain from this policy equal to 6.7
percent of income.  Since subsidies to consumption of essential food commodities and
pharmaceuticals  distort resource allocation toward production and consumption of these
commodities,  the aggregate welfare gain is less than the policy of exchange rate unification
without subsidies to consumption  (6.9 percent). But, quantitatively, the production distortions of
import subsidies are much more important the consumption distortions.
16There is no change in the price of any of the essential commodities  by design of the
experiment.'7 Since all subsidies to foreign exchange  are eliminated in this scenario (not only
those to essential commodities) the net fiscal impact to the government  is positive.'8 Then the
poor households  gain in this scenario, but considerably less than with elimination of foreign
exchange subsidies without subsidies to food consumption.  The lower gains to poor households
are explained by the fact that there are less fiscal gains to be distributed back to households due
to the subsidies to food consumption. The model helps us to understand that this potential policy
designed to help the poor can be counterproductive  to their interests.
Lowering tariffs and introducing competition
The government intends to introduce foreign competition in the Iranian marketplace
subsequent to tariffication of non-tariff barriers. Since the government intends to follow a
gradual approach to tariff liberalization, we simulate a possible sequential process of lowering
tariffs in two steps. In the first step, we lower all tariffs above 25 percent to 25 percent, leaving
all other tariffs unchanged.  In the second step, we impose a uniform tariff of 15 percent.  Unless
otherwise  indicated, all simulations are performed  based on a benchmark equilibrium in which
rent dissipation  is assumed.  The simulation we perform combines the effect of tariffication of
NTBs and lowering tariffs in some sectors. That is, we eliminate the NTBs and tariffy them, but
alter the tariff rate relative to the tariff equivalent based on the tariff assumption we make in the
scenario.  For example, the clothing tariff is less than full tariffication in the maximum 25 percent
scenario.  We infer the marginal impact of lowering the tariffs as the difference between the
scenario that combines the effect of removing NTBs and lowering tariffs with the scenario  in
which we only do tariffication.of NTBs.  (We use the term tariff to refer to the combined import
duty plus commercial benefit tax.)
Maximum 25 Percent Tariffs. First consider the simulation in which all sectors with
tariffs above 25 percent have their tariffs lowered to 25 percent along with tariffication of NTBs
in other sectors.  The results are presented in table 3, column 3.  Aggregate welfare increases
relative to the initial equilibrium by 4.1 percent of real consumer income. The average effective
or collected tariff is initially 2.5 percent and increases to 19.4 percent. When the maximum tariff
is 25 percent the average effective tariff is reduced to 15.3 percent.
Regarding the marginal effect of lowering the tariffs, given tariffication of NTBs,
we observe that the marginal impact of lowering the high tariffs to 25 percent maximum is 0.6
percent of real consumer income.  By the standards of welfare results for trade liberalization this
is a rather large gain in welfare for a change in the average tariff rate of this magnitude. It
illustrates once again that biggest gains in a trade policy reform are derived from lowering
protection to moderate levels in the sectors with the very high protection.
" Results  in table 3A on prices are for the price received by producers.  The price paid by consumers is less than this
due to the subsidy to consumers.
18 On the other hand, there is a net fiscal cost to the government  from consumption subsidies for a particular product
relative to an import subsidy.
17As shown in table  1, the sectors with highest tariffs after tariffication are: textiles (74),
clothing (93), weaving and leather products (75), and motor vehicles (37). These tariffs, and
those in glass and other food products, are lowered to 25 percent, with other tariffs unchanged.
The reduction in protection results in a deprecation of the real exchange rate by 2.5 percent,
which induces an increase in exports by 4.5 percent.  Three of the four sectors with the highest
protection are the ones that contract, while the other sectors  expand. When the combined effects
of tariffication and maximum 25 percent tariffs are considered, the negative impact on these
sectors is muted, but still negative.
The weaving and leather products sector is interesting  since we estimate it will expand
despite the lowering of nominal protection.  This is for two reasons:  (1) the depreciation of the
real exchange rate helps the exports of this sector along with all other export sectors and (2)
imported textile products decline in price significantly and 30 percent of the intermediate inputs
used by this sector are textiles.
Uniform 15 Percent Tariffs.  The impact of tariffication  and moving all tariffs to 15
percent is presented in table 3, column 4.19  Combining elimination of NTBs with tariff
uniformity at  15 percent results in an increase in aggregate welfare relative to the initial
equilibrium by 5.5 percent of real consumer income, where the impact of removing the NTBs
with rent dissipation is included. The marginal impact of imposing uniform tariffs is 2.0 percent.
The impact on output by sector is similar to the 25 percent maximum tariff scenario.
Impact on the Poor. The combined effect of tariffication and lowering tariff protection
has a strong positive impact on the income of the poorest households.  Fifteen percent uniform
tariffs and elimination of the NTBs  results in a 20 percent increase in the income of the poorest
rural household and an  1 percent increase in the income of the poorest urban household. All
households  gain, but the percentage increase  in income declines monotonically with income
since the equal lump sum transfers by government of the fiscal surplus represents a higher
percentage of income for the poorer households.
The marginal impact of lowering tariff protection given tariffication has a negative
revenue impact on the government.  The adverse fiscal impact is greater with the 25 percent
maximum tariff scenario  (0.7 decline in revenue) than with the  15 percent uniform tariff (0.4
percent decline in revenue).  This is because with tariff uniformity the low tariffs are raised to 15
percent, which increases revenue, partly offsetting the revenue loss for the lowering of the tariffs
above  15 percent.  Since the impact on the poor is primarily a function of the lump sum transfers,
and if the fiscal effect is negative we assume a lump sum transfer from households to the
government, the marginal impact on the poor of lowering tariff protection given prior
tariffication is negative. The combined impact of the trade reforms contemplated by the
government in the Third Five Year Development Plan are positive on the poor, provided the poor
receive  as transfers their share of the fiscal surplus that is generated.
'9 Tariffs are a uniform  15 percent in this scenario except for petroleum products.  We assume that the tariffs on
petroleum products are part of energy policy that we separately analyze.
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As we discussed in the model section, petroleum prices are sold domestically at prices
about only 10 percent of world prices.  In this scenario we remove the enormous  subsidies to
energy products. The results are presented  in table 4, column 3. Eliminating the subsidy to
domestic consumption of petroleum  products results in an enormous increase  in welfare of 33
percent of consumption.  The large gains are partly the result of starting with such a large
distortion: petroleum  subsidies are initially  18 percent of GDP. If the fiscal  surplus from the
elimination of the petroleum product subsidies is transferred back to the households  in equal
amounts, the poorest rural (urban) household  gains over 200 (100)  percent of income.
The elimination of the energy product subsidies results in a large  decline in the domestic
demand for crude oil production.  Given homogenous domestic and exports crude oil products,
crude oil exports  expand dramatically by 76 percent. Resulting  in a significant appreciation of
the real exchange rate by 26 percent. Consequently, there is a Dutch disease problem regarding
exports of the rest of the economy, who see their exports decline.20
Several  energy intensive  manufacturing  sectors suffer significant output declines
(between 25 and 63 percent) in this scenario.  This includes basic metals and steel; other materials
and chemicals;  copper, aluminum and other basic products; motor vehicles; radio and TV
equipment;  and other industrial products. Farming, food products and several services sectors
experience significant expansion.  Output declines of this magnitude are likely to result in
significant adjustment costs to relocate and retrain workers; we do not estimate these adjustment
costs.21 It is also likely, however, that over time the energy intensive  sectors will adjust by
becoming more efficient in the use of energy,  a possibility that is not permitted in our model
except through the substitution of capital and labor. The latter effect would imply less output
adjustment than we have estimated, and less implied adjustment costs.
Combining Trade and Exchange  Rate Reform
In these scenarios we combine  the effects of tariffication of NTBs, unification of the
exchange rate  for imports  and exports,  and lowering tariffs.  We consider two tariff policies: a
uniform tariff at 15 percent and zero tariffs. The results are in tables 4 and 4A, columns  1 and 2.
The welfare gain from combining these policies is  12.3 percent of the consumption with 15
percent uniform tariffs and 12.7 percent with zero tariffs.  The poor gain enormously from these
combined policies but the poor gain more from the  15 percent uniform tariff because there is less
fiscal surplus to distribute to the poor if tariffs are zero. The impact on production is dominated
by the sectors that benefit from the elimination of the foreign exchange  subsidies.
20 Even fuel oil exports decline since the real exchange  appreciation  of 26 percent,  results in a larger decline in the
domestic price of exports than in the price of domestic fuel oil products.
21  Estimates of adjustment  costs have  found that adjustment costs  are typically very small in relation to the benefits
of trade liberalization.  See Matusz and Tarr (2000).
19Combining Energy and Exchange  Rate Reform
As shown in table 4, column 4, combining exchange rate reforn  with energy reform
increases the aggregate welfare gain to 39 percent of benchmark consumption.  Since both energy
and exchange rate reform increase revenues to the government,  there is a potential enormous
increase in welfare to the poor if the fiscal surplus is distributed back lump sum to households.
The poorest rural household gains 239 percent and the poorest urban household gains 116
percent. All households gain, but the percentage  gains decrease with the income level of the
household.
Combining Trade, Energy and Exchange Rate Reform
Finally, in table 4, columns 5 and 6, we present estimates of the gains from combining all
the key policy reforms in the pricing area that we have considered.  We consider two options
regarding the ultimate tariff policy:  uniform  15 percent tariff (column 5) and free trade (column
6). The estimates are that the Iranian economy would experience  and enormous gain of more
than 50 percent of the value of consumption following the combined reforms. Aggregate gains
from the combined policies with the zero tariff option are 50.7 percent of consumption. If tariffs
are a uniform  15 percent then the aggregate welfare gains are slightly less at 50.1 percent of
consumption.  Again, the poor gain slightly more from the uniform tariff at  15 percent since we
assume the fiscal surplus is distributed to the poor and there is a greater fiscal surplus to
distribute with the  15 uniform tariff.
20V. Conclusion
Iran plans to transform to a market based economy and many of the needed reforms are
embodied in the 3  Five Year Development Plan. We have obtained an unusually rich set of data
on the distortions that prevailed in the year 2000.  These distortions were very large. Petroleum
product subsidies were  18 percent of GDP.  Subsidies to foreign exchange  were over 6 percent of
GDP and non-tariff barriers were estimated to average about  17 percent of the value of imports.
The estimated gains in welfare that we find are extremely large by the standards of these
types of constant returns to scale comparative  static model.  The very large estimated welfare
gains reflect the unusually high level of distortions present at the starting point of the reform.
Iran has implemented many of its policies through subsidies and non-tariff barriers. The
fiscal impact of all these reforms will be strongly positive. The combined fiscal impact of all the
reforms (with a  15 percent uniform tariff) is estimated to be an increase by 18.5 of GDP. This
fiscal surplus generated by the reforms presents great opportunities  for Iran to help the poor with
direct income payments.  We find that despite the fact that many of the policy interventions  are
rationalized as support for the poor, direct income payments, even if not targeted to the poor,
have the potential to enormously increase the income of the poor compared with the market
interventions that prevail.
21References
Ahangarani, Rouyan Mashayekh,  "An Almost Ideal Demand System for Iran," IRDP, Working Paper,
1999.
Barzel, Yoram  (1974), "A Theory of Rationing by Waiting,"  The Journal  of  Law and Economics, 17,  73 -
95.
Bernstein, Paul  M., W. David Montgomery, Thomas F. Rutherford, and Gui-Fang Yang  (1999), "Effects
of Restrictions  on International Permit Trading:  The MS-MRT Model",  in John Weyant (ed.)  The
Costs of  the Kyoto Protocol: a Multi-Model Evaluation,  Special Issue of The Energy  Journal.
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1971), "The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare,"  in J. Bhagwati,  R.
Jones, R. Mundell and J. Vanek (eds.),  Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, Amsterdam:
North Holland.
Harrison,  G. W., T. F.  Rutherford, and D. G. Tarr (1993),  "Trade Reform  in the Partially Liberalized
Economy of Turkey,"  The World Bank Economic Review,  7 (2),  191-217.
Harrison,  G. W., T. F. Rutherford, and D. G. Tarr (1997a), "Quantifying  the Uruguay Round," Economic
Journal, 107,  September,  1405-1430.
Harrison,  G. W., T. F. Rutherford, and D. G. Tarr (1  997b),  "Economic  Implications for Turkey of a
Customs Union With the European Union," European  Economic Review, 41, 861-870.
Hope, Elinar, and Balbir Singh (1995), "Energy Price Increases  in Developing Countries: Case Studies of
Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia,  Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe,"  Policy Research Working Paper
1442, The World Bank.
Matusz,  Steve and David. Tarr (2000), "Adjusting to Trade Liberalization,"  in Anne 0. Krueger (ed.),
Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Melo, J. de and David. Tarr (1990),  "Welfare Costs of U.S. Quotas  in Textiles,  Steel and Autos," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 72 (3), 489-497.
Melo, J. de and David. Tarr (1992), A General  Equilibrium  Analysis of US Foreign Trade Policy,
Cambridge MA.: MIT Press.
Melo, J. de and David. Tarr (1993), "Industrial Policy in the Presence of Wage Distortions:  The Case of
the US Auto and Steel Industries," International  Economic Review, 34 (4), 833-851.
Morkre, Morris and David G. Tarr (1980), Effects of  Restrictions on United States Imports. Five Case
Studies and Theory, Washington,  D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.
Morkre, Morris and David G. Tarr (1995),  "Reforming Hungarian Agricultural Trade Policy: A
Quantitative Evaluation,"  Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, 131(1),  106-131.
Rutherford,  Thomas, Elizabet Rutstrom and David Tarr (1997)  "Morocco's  Free Trade Agreement with
the EU: A Quantitative Assessment,"  Economic Modelling, Vol.  14, No. 9, 237-269,  April.
Rutherford,  Thomas and David Tarr (forthcoming),  "Trade Liberalization,  Product Variety and Growth
in a Small Open Economy:  A Quantitative  Assessment," Journal  of International  Economics.
Tarr, D. G. and M. Morkre (1984), Aggregate Costs to the United States of Tariffs and Quotas on
Imports, Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.
22World  Bank (1999), Economic Aspects of  Increasing  Energy Prices  to Border  Levels in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Report  1980IRN, Washington  DC: The World Bank.
World Bank (2001), Iran, Trade and Foreign  Exchange Policies in Iran:  Reform Agenda, Economic
Implications and  Impact on the Poor, Report 2295 3-IRN, Washington DC: The World Bank.
23Table 1. Production sectors in the model and the policy instruments
(Data are the percentage rates of the distortions)
Commercial
Commercial  Non-Tariff  Benefit Tax  Energy  Foreign
Import Duty  Benefit Tax  Barrier (tariff  (post  subsidy to  exchange
(pre-reform)  equivalent)  tariffication  consump-  subsidy for
of NTBs)  tion  imports
1  Farming  0.1  0.7  9.2  10.0  63.0
2  Livestock  0.1  0.7  19.1  20.0
3  Other agriculture  0.1  0.7  14.2  15.0
4  Mining  0.5  1.1  13.7  15.0
5  Crude oil
6  Sugar  79.0
7  Other food  0.1  0.4  29.5  30.0  31.0
8  Paper & print  0.7  2.4  6.4  9.0
9  Cement  1.1  1.0  19.6  21.0
10  Brick  1.1  8.2  11.7  21.0
11  Gypsum & other minerals  0.7  2.3  18.2  21.0
12  Glass  1.3  6.5  21.8  30.0
13  Other non-metal products  1.1  5.3  14.8  21.0
14  Textiles  0.4  2.3  69.8  74.0
15  Clothing  3.1  11.1  69.1  90.0
16  Weaving & leather products  0.6  3.6  67.6  74.0
17  Rubber & plastic products  0.4  1.3  23.3  25.0
18  Pharmaceutical products  79.0
19  Kerosene  0.1  0.1  92.0
20  Fuel oil  0.1  0.1  94.0
21  Gasoline  0.1  0.1  74.0
22  Gas oil  0.1  0.1  91.0
23  Liquid gas  0.1  0.1
24  Other materials & chemical  0.3  1.7  7.2  9.0
products
25  Basic metal & steel products  0.4  3.1  16.3  20.0
26  Copper & aluminum  & other  0.4  3.1  16.3  20.0
basic products
27  Metal products  1.0  4.9  4.8  10.0
28  Industrial machinery  0.6  2.1  7.7  10.0  59.0
29  Radio & TV equipment  1.2  2.8  16.5  20.0
30  Motor vehicles  1.4  2.1  32.8  36.0
31  Other industrial products  0.5  2.9  16.5  20.0
32  Electricity
33  Water




38  Hotel & motels
39  Load transport
40  Passenger transport
41  Post & telecommunications
42  Other transport & storage
43  Other services
Source: Iranian Ministry of Industry, Iranian Ministry of Oil,  and authors'  estimates  as explained in
the text.
24Table 2. Expenditure shares by household  type (in percent)
Households  Energy  Transportation  Food  Other  Total
Rural 1  4  23  44  29  100
Rural 2  4  15  49  33  100
Rural 3  3  22  44  31  100
Rural 4  3  15  47  35  100
Rural 5  3  19  43  35  100
Rural 6  3  16  39  42  100
Rural 7  3  20  41  37  100
Rural 8  3  12  43  41  100
Rural 9  3  14  37  47  100
Rural  10  1  6  14  79  100
Urban  1  2  11  35  52  100
Urban  2  3  9  34  54  100
Urban 3  2  13  29  55  100
Urban 4  2  12  29  56  100
Urban 5  2  10  27  60  100
Urban 6  2  10  28  60  100
Urban 7  2  11  26  61  100
Urban 8  2  9  22  67  100
Urban  9  2  8  17  73  100
Urban  10  1  5  10  83  100
Note: Rural household  I is a representative household representing  the poorest 10
percent of Iranian rural  households. Rural household  10 represents the richest 10
percent of Iranian rural  households. Each rural household contains 3.2% of all Iranian
households.  Urban  households are defined analogously where each  urban household
represents 6.8% of all Iranian households.
Source. Authors' aggregations of expenditure  categories based on the
1999/2000 Iranian Household Expenditure  Survey.
25Table 3.  Impact of Trade and Exchange  Rate Reforms
Initial situa-  Tarrifica-  Tariffication  Tariffication  Tariffication  Exchange  Exchange
tion (level  tion  without rent  & maximum  & Uniform  Rate  Unifi-  Rate  Unifi-
values)  dissipation  25% tariff  15%  tariff  cation  cation &
Food
Subsidies
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1.  Aggregate  welfare  3.4  -0.4  4.1  5.5  6.9  6.7
change  (% of income)
2.  Fiscal effects (change as % of GDP)
Food subsidies  -2.1
Foreign exchange  -6.4  -0.3  -0.1  -0.8  -0.2  6.4  6.4
subsidies
Petroleum  subsidies  -18.1  -0.8  -0.1  -1.7  -1.9  2.7  2.3
Import taxes  0.3  2.0  2.0  1.7  1.6  0.0  0.0
Oil rent  15.7  0.5  0.1  1.4  1.5  -3.8  -3.7
Net effect  1.4  1.9  0.7  1.0  5.3  2.9
3.  Average effective tariff  2.5  19.4  19.5  15.3  13.9  2.8  2.8
rate  (%)
4.  Trade effects (% change)
Real exchange rate  1.1  0.2  3.6  3.8  -13.0  -12.2
Aggregate Exports  1.0  0.1  5.6  4.9  -21.9  -22.4
5.  Factor incomes (% change)
Wage rate  -0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  3.0  6.8
Return to capital  -0.4  -0.2  1.1  1.4  -4.7  -1.7
6.  Price of essential goods (% change)
Primary food items  1.2  0.3  1.6  2.5  10.5
Food products  0.6  0.2  0.8  0.4  6.0
Sugar  0.0  0.0  0.6  7.4  37.6
Pharmaceuticals  -0.3  -0.1  0.8  2.3  1.0
7.  Change  in household welfare  (%  of income)
Rural 1  23.3  27.9  15.6  20.2  72.0  46.3
Rural 2  15.2  16.6  10.9  14.2  44.6  30.5
Rural 3  10.8  10.4  8.3  10.9  30.4  21.8
Rural 4  9.8  8.9  7.9  10.4  26.6  19.7
Rural 5  8.0  6.3  6.9  9.0  20.9  16.1
Rural 6  6.3  3.9  6.0  7.9  15.6  12.7
Rural 7  5.6  2.9  5.6  7.4  13.0  11.3
Rural 8  5.2  2.4  5.7  7.5  11.7  10.7
Rural 9  3.6  0.1  4.7  6.2  6.7  7.3
Rural 10  1.1  -3.8  2.6  3.6  -0.4  1.9
Urban  1  11.1  10.6  8.3  10.9  32.0  21.9
Urban 2  7.5  5.6  6.3  8.3  19.9  14.9
Urban 3  5.9  3.2  5.4  7.1  14.8  11.6
Urban 4  5.0  2.0  5.0  6.7  11.9  9.9
Urban 5  4.4  1.1  4.7  6.2  9.9  8.6
Urban 6  3.9  0.5  4.4  5.9  8.4  7.8
Urban 7  3.3  -0.4  4.1  5.5  6.5  6.5
Urban 8  2.6  -1.6  3.7  4.9  4.0  4.9
Urban 9  1.8  -2.7  3.1  4.2  1.9  3.4
Urban  10  0.9  -4.1  2.4  3.5  -0.7  1.5
Source:  Authors' estimates.
26~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  CD  ~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~0*0*0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  0~~~~~~~0  - ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  C
B  Rcc2w,o  -^  -'  . -,  C  D-,  cD  a  C-  2*
CD (T  O  C  o  c-
0.  O  D  I0  - 9  CDC
o  o  s
0
0  D  0  a
0
0  O  nw<  4  n  e  o  ;e  e  ?  o  o  Ds  - <  ou  o  ocoDi  :_
o  o  u  n  -E  o  - o  o  ~  -DO.  O0  - s  0  C  CD 0 -. ¢ 
0~~~~~~~~~~
CD
?  ?  - 0  - o  °  0-  0  0  °  0  O  R  o  -0  0  0  o  0  0  0  00  0Q  0z  i-  -Q  - 0  ?  0  0  00  .*o  i  °  ?  :~  ' 
0  0  o  o  o  o0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  5  0  5  0  0x  g_ot  C  i  w-.  0  CO  OOO  -Oh<9Ot  n  zo 
0  0  0o  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  - - i  0  0  i  0  0  o  - 0  0  o0  ozt 
000~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  - 0  0  00  0  - AW  0  0  00  00  0  0  W  ?  0  0  0,  ,,,,,  00,  ,  , _  ,  ,,, ,.
- - w  - 0o  -s  -o  0  - o  - w  -S  0s  ;-  0  °  -A  l;_j_j  nj  - - 0…0  sisWos)  ;'3  ia
000  000  00000  00000  0  0  0000  00  A  OO  OAOO  0  0  A  0  0
00  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  A  - 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  i  i  i
- - - - 0  - - - - 0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z
00  0  CO  0000  0  A  00  A  0  A0  A  0  0  A  A  0  A  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  - 0  A-C-  00  C
0  0  0 - 0  0 - 0  0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  - A  A  00  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cQc
0  0  0  - 0  0  - - 0  - 0  0  0  0  0  - 0  0  0  0  0  0  A  A  0-  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0…0  fl  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'c  C
00  A  - 0  0  0  0  0  0-  00  A  ~~~~~~~~0  0  0  0  0  0  0  - A  0  0  0  0  0  000~cQ  c  00  0  0  0  -0
- - - 0  0  0  - 0  0  - -~~~~~~~~~~~-  -~~~  - - 0…CO  - - 0~~~6 
-- - - - 0  0  - 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C  I  0  *  ,  ,  ,-,  ,-  - - - -r
0  - - - 0  0  0  0  A  00  0  - 00  A  0  - 0  0000  0  0  0  00  0  - 0  0  - 0  A  0  A  00  0  0  A  0  A  0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  -. ~lz
tL~~~~~~~~C
o  s  S  o  5  5  0  5o5  5  C  0  A  0  A  0  - 0  - - A  0  - o 
00  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  ~  0  00  00  00  00  00  0  C
*  ,,,,*  0  00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P
0  0  0  0  A  A  0  A  0  0  0  0  00  A  0  A  0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  A  0000  0000  A  A  - A  A  A  S~~~~~~~~.  ...  ......  ..... .
C-DO  0-00  A  0000000000  0  00  0000  A  000  0  000000  A  00  00.-.L0L  ITable 4.  Impact of Combining Trade, Exchange Rate and Energy Pricing Reforms
Initial  Tariffication +  Tariffication +  Energy  Energy pricing  Energy pricing reform +
situation  exchange rate  exchange rate  pricing  reform +  tariffication +  exchange rate
(level  unification +  unification +  zero  reform  exchange rate  unification +  tariff reform
value)  uniform  15% tariffs  tariffs  unification
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
15%  uniform  Zero tariffs
tariffs
1.  Aggregate welfare change (%  of  14.0  12.7  32.9  38.8  50.1  50.7
income)
2.  Fiscal effects (change as %  of GDP)
Food subsidies
Foreign exchange subsidies  -6.4  6.4  6.4  2.1  6.4  6.4  6.4
Petroleum  subsidies  -18.1  0.8  -0.3  18.1  18.1  18.1  18.1
Import taxes  0.3  1.6  -0.3  0.1  0.1  2.1  -0.3
Oil rent  15.7  -2.2  -0.6  -7.0  -9.2  -8.1  -6.6
Net effect  6.6  5.1  13.3  15.3  18.5  17.6
3.  Averageeffectivetariffrate(%)  2.5  14.0  2.7  2.9  14.7
4.  Trade effects (%  change)
Real exchange rate  -8.5  -3.5  -26.1  -35.5  -31.9  -26.1
Aggregate Exports  -17.2  -8.9  30.4  16.6  25.8  35.3
5.  Factor incomes (%  change)
Wage rate  3.1  3.2  2.4  7.7  8.4  7.8
Return to capital  -3.7  -1.3  -6.1  -7.1  -5.8  -3.7
6.  Price of essential  goods (%  change)
Primary food items  13.5  13.1  8.2  19.4  24.9  23.9
Food products  7.4  6.9  4.3  8.1  10.3  9.5
Sugar  40.9  41.9  -0.3  36.4  41.6  42.1
Pharmaceuticals  2.1  3.1  -4.0  -1.2  0.4  1.4
7.  Change  in household welfare  (%  of income)
Rural 1  95.6  77.7  209.8  239.1  292.2  282.9
Rural 2  60.8  50.5  139.0  157.2  193.3  188.7
Rural 3  42.5  36.1  98.5  112.8  140.2  137.4
Rural 4  38.1  32.9  90.0  102.4  128.1  126.2
Rural 5  30.7  27.1  73.1  84.0  105.9  104.7
Rural 6  24.0  21.9  58.7  67.8  86.3  85.8
Rural 7  20.8  19.5  51.6  60.0  77.1  77.2
Rural 8  19.6  18.7  49.5  56.8  73.6  74.2
Rural 9  12.9  13.4  34.6  40.6  53.9  55.0
Rural 10  2.8  5.2  11.9  15.6  21.6  23.2
Urban  1  44.3  37.3  102.6  116.3  143.1  139.5
Urban 2  28.9  25.4  70.3  79.8  99.4  97.9
Urban 3  22.4  20.3  55.1  63.5  80.0  79.2
Urban 4  18.9  17.7  47.5  54.9  69.8  69.6
Urban  5  16.3  15.8  41.8  48.4  62.0  62.2
Urban 6  14.4  14.3  37.8  43.9  56.5  56.9
Urban  7  12.0  12.5  32.1  37.7  49.2  49.9
Urban  8  8.8  10.0  25.1  29.9  39.6  40.7
Urban 9  5.7  7.5  18.4  22.6  30.3  31.5
Urban  10  2.3  5.0  10.5  13.9  19.4  21.1
Source: Authors' estimates.
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To calibrate our model, we have constructed  a database that represents  a benchmark
equilibrium.  This appendix documents the sources of the data and describes how the different
data pieces have been combined.
We use four main data sources to construct the database:  (1)  an Input-Output (10) table
for Iran from 1995; (2) a household expenditure survey (HES) of Iran from  1999/2000;  (3)
policy data, including tariffs, subsidies to imports and to energy products and tariff equivalence
of non-tariff barriers  from various Iranian Ministries and agencies including the Central Bank,
the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Oil and the Customs
Department;  and (4) estimates of Iranian elasticities (where available).  We combine the data into
a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that constitutes the basis for our modeling effort.
The 10 table provides data on the costs of intermediate inputs and value added (labor and
capital)  in 43 production  sectors and it distinguishes household demand, government demand,
investment demand, export demand and import supply by sector. The household demand  is
divided in two categories:  urban household  demand and rural household demand. To further
disaggregate the households,  we use the HES to decompose both rural and urban households
into 1O household types, where households are grouped according to income.  That is, all Iranian
households have been grouped into one of the 20 household types depending on their income
level and whether they are rural or urban.
Unfortunately,  the IO table and the HES are not consistent with respect to total rural and
total urban household demand by sector.  We therefore use share data from the HES to
decompose the IO table's data on rural and urban household demand. That is, for each sector and
for both rural and urban households, we calculate  each of the  10 household types'  share in total
household demand by sector in the HES, and then apply these shares in the  LO table. We then
have a table with the 20 households' expenditure  on output from the 43 production sectors.
Neither the 10 table nor the HES provide data on the income pattern by household type.
We therefore have no information on the distribution of income across factors of production nor
on the sector in which the income comes  from. We therefore make the strong assumption that all
households have identical income patterns.
The IO table also has little information on the policies we want to analyze and the data
that it does contain - collected import tariff revenues - do not represent current policies given the
delay in the publication of the 10 table. We have therefore relied on Iranian ministries for our
dataset on policy parameters for barriers to imports (tariffs and non-tariff barriers),  foreign
exchange  subsidies, and subsidies to domestic  petroleum consumption.
The data on barriers to imports and on foreign exchange subsidies are described in detail
section 2 of the main text. The IO table reports the costs of imports to the user of the imports, so
in constructing the SAM, we incorporated the data on the barriers to imports by deducting the
costs of the barriers to arrive at the border costs of the imports.  In the case of foreign exchange
30subsidies, we derive the border costs of the imports by adding the value of the foreign exchange
subsidy to user costs of imports to arrive  at the border costs.
The data on energy subsidies were presented in table 0. Since the petroleum subsidies
apply to domestic  consumption they effectively apply to both imports and domestic production.
In the case of imports, we add the subsidy to the user costs of imports to get the border costs of
the petroleum  imports. In the case of domestic production, we add the subsidy to the costs of
production.
Our database  also includes a set of elasticities. Many sources were used for the
elasticities.  We employed the study of Ahangarani  (1999) who estimated a system of demand
functions for Iran. We also employed the study by Hope and Singh (1995) for energy elasticities.
These studies suggest that the price elasticities of demand for different energy goods are between
-0.2 and -1.  We employed -0.4. In a CES function with a small energy cost share this implies an
elasticity of substitution of 0.4.
These studies suggest income and price elasticities of household goods of about  1 and -
1, respectively.  This corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas utility function.  Some essential household
goods are reported to have price elasticities less than unity. We choose -0.4 for these goods.
In most economies, the capital-value  share in total value-added is constant in the long
run, which is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function for total value added.
Most studies suggest low substitutability between most intermediate inputs in different
product categories,  corresponding to the Leontief production function for the aggregate of
intermediate  goods (see, for example,  de Melo and Tarr,  1992). Finally, most studies suggest
energy demand elasticities  in production between -0.2 and -0.7 - we chose an average value of -
0.5 (see, for example, Hope and Singh,  1995).
In the remaining  cases, we use estimates employed in similar analyses, such as de Melo
and Tarr (1992); Harrison,  Rutherford, and Tarr (1993); and Rutherford, Rutstrom, and Tarr
(1997).  In particular, we choose a value of three for the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign varieties in demand. For energy goods, which are relatively homogeneous,
we choose a value of six. Figures  5.1 and 5.2 show the nesting structure of the production
functions and the utility functions along with the assumed elasticities of substitution.
31Figure  1: Production and Allocation of Output
Domestic  Supply
Gross Output  CET  = 3 (a = 6 for non-oil energy)
Export Supply
Leontief
\/  \/  C~=0
Value-added and Energy  Intermediate
CES  Leontief
a=0.5  =0
Energy  Value-added  Composite  Composite
l  I  Intermediate  Intermediate
ES  a(  = 0.5  Cobb-Douglas  CES
CT ~  CES  a=3  a=3
Energy Good  I  Energy Good 7
Capital  Labor  Domestic  Imported  Domestic  Imported
CES  CES  Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate
CS  (y =6  a  =6
Domestic  Imported  Domestic  Imported
Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate  Intermediate
32Figure 2:  Crude Oil Productiona-/ and Allocation
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a_/  The farming and livestock sectors  share the same production structure,  but their exports and domestic outputs are differentiated.
b_/ 6* is calibrated  such that elasticity of supply equals  0.5.
33Figure 3:  Energy Sectors a_/
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35Figure 5: Market for Energy Projects, with Endogenous Consumption Subsidy
Price  /
PC  '  SD 
D
Quantity of Energy Products
Energy product prices  are initially subsidized by the government such that the price to domestic
consumers  is fixed at Pc.  WP is the fixed world price and ER is the real  exchange rate,  so WP*ER is
price domestic firms receive  for exports.  With Sd as the domestic supply  curve,  domestic firms produce
the quantity CF. Domestic consumers  consume CE and domestic firms export EF. Deadweight loss  is
the shaded area ADE and the government  subsidy is the area ABCE. The height of the government
subsidy, AE is endogenous, and depends, among  other things,  on the world  price and the real exchange
rate.
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Import subsidy:  Initially essential commodity import prices are subsidized  at the ad valorem rate s, so
imports are supplied at WP  (I  -s) ER where WP is the world price, s the subsidy rate and ER the real
exchange  rate. With Sd as the domestic supply curve,  SO is the quantity supplied domestically and Q. is
the quantity demanded, with imports  as the difference.  Deadweight  losses  are the sum of production
and consumption  deadweight  losses  = ABF+GCE.  Government subsidy = ABCE.
Consumption subsidy: The subsidy ridden  demand curve is depicted as a shift to the right relative to
the undistorted demand  curve. The import subsidy is removed, but the government provides a subsidy
to consumers such that the domestic price paid by consumers does  not change in equilibrium.  QO  is
demanded by consumers,  Si is supplied by domestic firms and imports are the difference. Deadweight
losses  are reduced relative to import subsidies to the consumption deadweight  losses  GCE; but
the government subsidy increases to HGCE.
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